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Abstract
This paper provides novel evidence on the time varying impact of government
spending shocks on output in Germany over the years 1970 to 2013. In a first step,
I use an expectations-augmented vector autoregressive model with time varying
parameters (TVP-VAR) to show that fiscal multipliers are not stable over time but
exhibit a u-shaped pattern. While multipliers fluctuate around 2 at the beginning
and end of the sample, they are much smaller in between. In a second step, I discuss
which factors determine the magnitude of German multipliers and hence explain
the observed variation. It turns out that fiscal policy is more effective when business
uncertainty is high but less in periods of financial market stress, while the state of
the business cycle is minor important. Moreover, I find that fiscal sustainability is a
crucial determinant of the multipliers and that these are about 1 euro higher since
the loss of monetary policy autonomy due to the adoption of the euro. And finally, I
conclude that policy recommendations based on averagemultipliers aremisleading.
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“It seems to me that the German people - pointedly - can withstand a 5% price increase
better than 5% unemployment.” - Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, July
28, 1972, p. 8
“We will cut back state benefits, promote personal responsibility and have to request a
greater contribution from each individual.” - Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Government
Declaration, March 14, 2003
“We do not want to simply survive this crisis. [...] We want to use this crisis as an op-
portunity. [...] These are signals that should not be overlooked, and that create reasons for
action. [...] Because of this, doing nothing is not an option.” - Chancellor Angela Merkel,
Government Declaration, January 14, 2009
Original quotes are in German. Own translation.1
1 Introduction
The attitude of German policymakers towards the role of government in general and fiscal stim-
ulus in particular has changed several times over the past decades. During the 1970s Keynesian
stabilization policy was in vogue and fiscal authorities believed that discretionary government
spending is a good thing, even if it comes at the cost of higher inflation. While the government
spending share of output was about 15% at the beginning of the 1970s, it had been risen to more
than 20% at the end of the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt in 1982 (see Figure 1).2 Inspired by
American Reaganomics and British Thatcherism, the Kohl administration conducted a different
policy and the share fell throughout the 1980s, until German reunification in 1990 called again
for a stronger role of government. In March 2003 Gerhard Schröder gave a famous government
declaration and more or less redefined the role of the German welfare state. Thanks to gener-
ous state benefits, public spending had reached unsustainable levels, so the tenor of his speech.
The declaration was followed by a series of supply-side reforms, including a deregulation of
the labor market and lower unemployment benefits (so-called Agenda 2010 and Hartz I to IV
reforms). With the outburst of the global financial and economic crisis in fall 2008, discretionary
1The original quotes in German are available here: de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phillips-Kurve#cite_note-4
(Helmut Schmidt), www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2003/rede_schroeder_03-14.html (Gerhard Schröder),
dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16198.pdf (Angela Merkel).
2I use the ratio of nominal government consumption and nominal gross domestic product (GDP). See
Section 2.1 and Appendix A for a detailed description of the data.
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government spending was back at the top of the political agenda, or as Angela Merkel put it
“[...] doing nothing is not an option”. In November 2008 and February 2009, the German par-
liament passed two deficit-financed stimulus packages summing to 74.5 billion euro or 3.1% of
GDP to counteract the economic downturn (so-called Konjunkturpaket I & II).3
But were these stimulus packages effective? And if yes, why? In this paper I address these
and a few other questions that come into mind when considering the German fiscal episodes
of the past decades. In particular, I quantify the degree of fiscal activism and explore whether
it has changed over time. Moreover, I investigate if the effectivity of discretionary government
spending, i.e. government spending shocks, has varied across periods. Finally, I discuss which
factors determine the effectivity of changes in spending. Addressing these questions is not only
interesting in its own right and a contribution to the recent debate on the economic effects of
fiscal stimulus packages,4 but also a prerequisite for sound policy recommendations.
To study the time varying impact of government spending shocks on output in Germany, I
proceed in two steps. In a first step, I run a vector autoregressive model with time varying pa-
rameters (TVP-VAR) on government spending and output. The model is the appropriate frame-
work to address the questions of interest since it allows for smooth and permanent changes in
the structure of the economy via drifting coefficients, while accounting for the possibility that
the size of spending shocks is not stable over time.5 In contrast to the regime-switching mod-
els of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a,b), the TVP-VAR is more flexible since it is not re-
stricted to only two states of the economy (recession vs. expansion, for example). Moreover, I
add professional forecasts for government spending and output to control for anticipation ef-
fects and avoid nonfundamentalness.6 The spending shock is identifiedwith a recursive scheme
and impulse responses are used to calculate fiscal multipliers as a measure of policy effectivity.
In a second step, I discuss which factors determine the size of German multipliers and ex-
plain the observed variation. To that end I regress the series of multipliers from the TVP-VAR on
a broad set of possible determinants, including cyclical, structural, and institutional factors. The
3See Gemeinschaftsdiagnose (2009), p. 49, Table 3.11, for an exact composition of both packages.
4See for example Coenen, Straub, and Trabandt (2013) for an analysis of the European Economic Re-
covery Plan (EERP) in the European Union, or Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) for the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in the United States.
5Applications of the TVP-VAR framework to fiscal policy include Pereira and Lopes (2010) for the U.S.,
Rafiq (2010, 2014) for the U.K., and Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) for the euro area.
6Nonfundamentalness arises in situations inwhich the information set of the econometrician is smaller
than that of the economic agents (see, e.g., Lippi and Reichlin, 1994, among others). Ramey (2011) empha-
sizes that neglecting anticipation effects in fiscal VARs can render impulse responses biased and proposes
to include news about future fiscal policy to overcome this potential problem.
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choice of these factors is motivated by standard economic models and the findings of the related
empirical literature. This paper hence fits into the growing literature on the state dependence of
fiscal policy multipliers (see, e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a,b; Bachmann and Sims,
2012; Corsetti, Meier, and Müller, 2012; Hristov, 2012, 2013; Born, Juessen, and Müller, 2013;
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh, 2013; Müller, 2014; Rafiq, 2014, among others).
The results are: First, I find that the degree of fiscal activism has declined over time. While
the size of spending shocks varies across periods, their posterior standard deviation is about
30% lower these days than at the beginning of the 1970s. Second, fiscal stimuli have a limited
and short-lived impact on German output, but tend to increase the government spending share
of output over longer horizons. Third, their impact is not stable over time, but exhibits a u-
shaped pattern. While multipliers fluctuate around 2 at the beginning and end of the sample,
they are much smaller in between. Fourth, I obtain evidence that German fiscal policy is more
effective when business uncertainty is high but less in periods of financial market stress, while
the state of the business cycle is minor important. Furthermore, I find that fiscal sustainabil-
ity is a crucial determinant of the multipliers and that these are much higher since the loss of
monetary policy autonomy due to the adoption of the euro. Other factors, such as exchange
rate flexibility, the degree of import penetration, private households’ access to credit, or Ger-
man reunification appear to be less relevant. In the light of these findings, I conclude that policy
recommendations based on averagemultipliers are misleading, but should take the state depen-
dence of the spending shocks into account. Moreover, I believe that this paper tells a cautionary
tale for fiscal policy to stimulate output in Germany.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the empirical strategy
and the data used. Section 3 documents the evidence on the time varying impact of government
spending shocks on German output. Section 4 presents a few extensions and robustness checks.
Section 5 discusses the determinants of the fiscal multipliers and offers an explanation for the
observed variation. Section 6 provides a summary of the results and concluding remarks.
2 Methodology and Data
In this section I outline the TVP-VAR model that is used to explore the time varying impact of
government spending shocks on output in Germany. The model allows for both time variation
in the coefficients and stochastic volatility. In addition, I include professional forecasts for the
variables of interest to control for anticipation effects. Furthermore, I describe the data used,
explain the identification strategy and present different measures of fiscal policy effectivity.
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2.1 Expectations-Augmented TVP-VAR
Consider the TVP-VAR model
Yt = ct +B1,tYt−1 + ...+Bp,tYt−p + ut = X
′
tBt + ut, (1)
where Yt is a 4 × 1 vector of endogenous variables including forecasted government spend-
ing growth (∆gf
t|t−1), forecasted output growth (∆y
f
t|t−1), actual government spending growth
(∆gt), and actual output growth (∆yt) in that order; ct is a 4×1 vector of time varying intercepts;
Bi,t are 4 × 4 matrices of time varying coefficients; i = 1, ..., p denotes the lags included; ut is a
4× 1 vector of residual terms with zero mean and time varying covariance matrix Ωt; and data
are available for t = 1, ..., T . Let X ′t = I4 ⊗
[
1, Y ′t−1, ..., Y
′
t−p
]
and Bt = vec
(
[ct, B1,t, ..., Bp,t]
′),
where⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and vec (·) is the column stacking operator, respectively.
The system in (1) is labelled an expectations-augmented TVP-VAR model since Yt includes pro-
fessional forecasts for the variables of interest ∆gt and ∆yt to control for anticipation effects. I
estimate the model using Bayesian methods as in Primiceri (2005), which are explained in detail
in Appendix B.
For actual government spending growth I use the annualised (log) change in real govern-
ment consumption and for actual output growth the annualised (log) change in real GDP. Both
series are streamed from the OECD Economic Outlook database. The corresponding forecasts
are obtained from the respective vintage of the OECD Economic Outlook, which is prepared
twice a year in July and December, providing predictions for real government consumption
growth and real GDP growth over the following half year. The availability and timing of these
forecasts hence dictate the frequency and definition of the series used to estimated the TVP-VAR
model. For that reason I consider semi-annual data from 1970:1 to 2013:1. A detailed description
of all series used in this paper is provided in Appendix A. Unfortunately, forecasts for real gov-
ernment investment growth are not available for all periods, and government spending is hence
measured by government consumption only. However, I do not regard this data limitation as a
disadvantage since government investment is only a small fraction of overall spending. Finally,
I follow common practice and fix the lag length at the frequency of the data, i.e. p = 2.7
The validity of the expectations-augmented TVP-VAR approach depends on the quality of
the forecasts used. It should be ensured that these are not biased in any direction. In Figure
2 it is shown that forecasted government spending growth closely tracks movements in actual
spending growth over time, showing no systematic deviations. This visual inspection is con-
7The results are not sensitive to alternative choices for p.
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firmed by Figure 3, which plots actual government spending growth againts its corresponding
forecasts together with a regression line obtained by regressing the former on the latter and a
constant (Mincer-Zarnowitz regression).8 While there is a strong positive correlation between
both series, the estimated coefficients indicate that the forecasts are both unbiased and efficient.
I can neither reject the null hypothesis that the constant is equal to zero (point estimate: 0.77;
standard error:9 0.47) nor that the slope is equal to one (point estimate: 0.78; standard error:
0.25) at conventional significance levels (p-values: 0.102 and 0.378, respectively). In fact, the
joint null has a p-value of 0.196 using a standard F-Test. Similar conclusions can be drawn for
the output growth forecasts that are depicted in Figures 4 and 5 together with their correspond-
ing actual values. While both series display a strong positive correlation, the regression analysis
also points to unbiasedness and efficiency of the forecasts. The estimated constant is 0.57 (stan-
dard error: 0.64) and the slope is 0.64 (standard error: 0.25), with p-values above conventional
significance levels (0.375 and 0.153, respectively). The joint null has a p-value of 0.233.
Taken together, I conclude that forecasts for government spending and output growth from
the OECD Economic Outlook perform well in terms of Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions, showing
no systematic bias in any direction, and including them into an otherwise standard TVP-VAR
model seems to be a reasonable way to control for anticipated movements in both variables.
2.2 Identifying Government Spending Shocks
Consider the following structural representation of the TVP-VAR model in Equation (1):
Yt = X
′
tBt + Ξtt, E
[
t
′
t
]
= I4, (2)
where Ξt maps the structural shocks t into the residual terms. If Ξt contains six restrictions for
any t = 1, ..., T , the system is just identified. In order to identify government spending shocks, I
follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a,b), assuming a recursive ordering of the variables
in Yt =
[
∆gf
t|t−1 ∆y
f
t|t−1 ∆gt ∆yt
]′
and calculate Ξt as the lower triangular Cholesky factor ofΩt.
The structural government spending shock is the innovation to government spending growth,
i.e. 3,t. No structural interpretation is attached to the remaining shocks.
8See Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969). The idea is the following. First, estimate∆gt = β0+β1∆g
f
t|t−1+ut
by ordinary least squares (OLS). Second, test H0 : βˆ0 = 0 and βˆ1 = 1. If one cannot reject the null
hypothesis at conventional significance levels, ∆gf
t|t−1 is called unbiased and efficient, implying that the
forecast error (∆gt −∆g
f
t|t−1) is white noise.
9I use White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
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Imposing a lower triangular structure on Ξt amounts to imposing the following restrictions
on the contemporaneous response of the variables to a government spending shock. First, fore-
casted government spending growth and forecasted output growth are not affected by a sur-
prise innovation to government spending growth in period t. This assumption is trivial since
both forecasts are made in t − 1 and are hence predetermined. Observe that by controlling for
expected changes in government spending and output growth, 3,t is indeed a surprise inno-
vation to government spending growth and not mixed up with an anticipated increase in ∆gt.
Second, output growth reacts immediately to a government spending shock, while government
spending growth does not respond to an innovation in output growth. The latter assumption is
standard in the related literature and reflects the delays that are inherent in the political system
(see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, among others).10
Finally, I compute impulse responses at horizon k as the difference between two conditional
expectations with and without the government spending shock:
IRFt+k = E (yt+k|It, 3,t = 1)− E (yt+k|It) , (3)
where It is the current information set. When calculating these conditional expectations I fol-
low Koop, Leon-Gonzalez, and Strachan (2009) and fix coefficient and covariance states at their
period t values, assuming constant parameters over the response horizon, which is equivalent
to setting all shocks to the model between period t and k to their expected values of zero.11
2.3 Measuring Fiscal Policy Effectivity
In order to assess the effectivity of fiscal policy, I follow common practice in the related literature
and rescale the impulse responses of output to a government spending shock by the government
spending share of output to put them in euro terms. The size of the output response may then
be interpreted as a fiscal policy multiplier, i.e. ∂y/∂g. There is, however, no such thing as a
fiscal multiplier per se, and I thus consider the four prevalent measures of the related literature.
10While this assumption seems natural for quarterly time series, one may argue that it is too restrictive
in case of semi-annual data since fiscal policy may easily respond to the state of the economy within six
months via discretionary changes in spending. However, Born and Müller (2012) test this restriction and
find that even annual spending is predetermined. See also Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2009).
11An alternative would be to simulate the future path of the coefficients and the covariance matrix,
hence taking into account all potential sources of uncertainty arising from changes in lagged coefficients,
contemporaneous relations, and additive innovations (see, e.g., Koop, 1996; Koop, Pesaran, and Potter,
1996, among others). As Koop himself emphasizes, however, such simulations can be computationally
intense and often lead to impulse responses that are similar to those setting future shocks to zero (see
Koop et al., 2009). Therefore I do not follow this avenue.
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The measures have their pros and cons and computing all of them therefore allows for a robust
assessment of fiscal policy effectivity. Let yk,t denote the output response at horizon k in period
t, gk,t the government spending response, and (g/y)t the government spending share of output.
The fiscal multipliers considered are:
Impact Multiplier The first measure relates the output response to the impact size of the gov-
ernment spending shock (see, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, among others):
IMk,t =
yk,t
g0,t
/ (g/y)t . (4)
Maximum Multiplier The second measure is similar to the first one, with the exception that the
maximum output response over a k period horizon is divided by the maximum government
spending response over the same horizon (see, e.g., Bachmann and Sims, 2012, among others):
MMk,t =
max (yk,t)
max (gk,t)
/ (g/y)t . (5)
Present Value Multiplier The third measure considers the entire path of the output and gov-
ernment spending response up to horizon k:
PVMk,t =
∑k
j=0 (1 + it)
−j yj,t∑k
j=0 (1 + it)
−j gj,t
/ (g/y)t , (6)
where it is the nominal interest rate, meaning that multipliers are expressed in terms of period
k = 0 euros (see, e.g., Mountford and Uhlig, 2009, among others).
Cumulative Multiplier The fourth measure is similar to the third one, but abstracts from dis-
counting, i.e. it = 0 for all t (see, e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012b, among others):
CMk,t =
∑k
j=0 yj,t∑k
j=0 gj,t
/ (g/y)t . (7)
While the four multipliers are different ways to measure fiscal policy effectivity, it should be
noted that they are identical in the period the spending shock materializes, i.e. k = 0.
3 Evidence on Time Variation
In this section I present the evidence on the time varying impact of government spending shocks
on output in Germany for the period 1970:1 to 2013:1. While the main focus is on changes in the
transmission mechanism, i.e. the output response to spending shocks of equal size, I begin by
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documenting if and how the size of the shocks itself has varied across periods. Then I present
impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in spending that are used to compute fiscal multipliers.
Finally, I discuss the time variation in multipliers, thereby providing an assessment of how the
effectivity of German fiscal policy has changed. Some robustness checks and extensions to the
baseline model are reported in Section 4, while I discuss possible determinants of the observed
variation in multipliers in Section 5.
3.1 Size of Spending Shocks
Figure 6 documents how the standard deviation of spending shocks has evolved over time. The
figure shows themedian of the posterior distribution (solid line) together with a 68 percent error
band (dashed line).
The evolution of the shock size squares well with the fiscal episodes outlined in the intro-
duction, supporting the plausibility of the identification strategy. While the posterior standard
deviation is large during the period of Keynesian stabilization policies in the 1970s, it is steadily
falling thereafter. Fiscal policy activism is particularly low during the first term of the Kohl ad-
ministration around 1985 and again in the mid 2000s. With German reunification in 1990, the
posterior standard deviation increases remarkably and stays high for a few years, but sharply
falls again in the late 1990s. The response of the Merkel administration to the Great Recession
in 2008/09 is reflected by a modest but temporary rise in the standard deviation.
In sum, I detect large swings in the size of spending shocks which mark important episodes
of German fiscal policy. However, I also find that the degree of fiscal activism has declined
over time, with a posterior standard deviation that is about 30% lower these days than at the
beginning of the 1970s.
3.2 Impulse Responses to Spending Shocks
In Figure 7 I plot the impulse responses to spending shocks in the baseline model which are the
basis for the fiscal multipliers that are discussed below. The size of the shocks is normalized to
1 percent. To obtain the impulse responses for forecasted government spending, forecasted out-
put, government spending and output, I cumulate the responses coming from their respective
growth rates. Each three-dimensional (3D) graph shows the posterior median at horizons 0 to
20 for the period 1970:1 to 2013:1. The x-axis plots the horizon, the y-axis denotes the year, and
the z-axis shows the response in percent.
The figure displays a hump-shaped response for government spending across all periods,
which settles after five years at 1.4 to 1.6 percent. The response is larger at the beginning and
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end of the sample than in between, but always above zero, meaning that a shock permanently
raises spending. Not surprisingly, forecasted government spending shows a similar pattern,
though its magnitude is lower than that of actual spending. In Section 2.1 I show, however, that
this difference is not statistically significant.
With respect to output I detect substantial variation across periods. The impact response
shows a u-shaped pattern, being roughly 0.3 percent before 1985 and after 2005 but is smaller in
between. In all periods, the response declines over time and varies between−0.4 and 0.2 percent
after five years. Taken together with the permanent increase of government spending, this
finding implies that the spending share of output rises following a positive shock to spending,
which may explain why the fiscal stimuli of the 1970s are associated with a permanent shift
in the spending to GDP ratio (see Figure 1). In addition, I find that the behavior of forecasted
output is consistent with that of actual output.
All in all, I conclude that the transmission of spending shocks to German output is not stable
across periods. In the next subsection I discuss how this finding affects the fiscal multipliers and
hence the effectivity of fiscal policy.
3.3 Fiscal Multipliers
Figure 8 shows the posterior median for the fiscal multipliers at horizons 0 to 20 for the period
1970:1 to 2013:1 in euro terms. Since the 3D plots do not account for the uncertainty surrounding
the multipliers, I document the posterior median for k = 0 together with a 68 percent error band
in Figure 9. Remember that the four multipliers are identical in that period. Similarly, I show
the multipliers at k = 20 in Figure 10. While for the impact multipliers the initial period is
particularly interesting, the remaining multipliers (maximum, present value and cumulative)
are most informative when the entire path of responses is considered.
It turns out that the multipliers display substantial time variation for k = 0. An increase
in spending of 1 euro lifts output by more than 2 euro at the beginning of the sample. This
value decreases thereafter and is about zero at the end of the 1980s, meaning that extra demand
generated by fiscal policy is completely counteracted by a fall in private absorption and/or net
exports in that time. At the beginning of the 1990s, multipliers start to rise and fluctuate again
around 2 since the early 2000s. Moreover, the error band largely supports positive multipliers
for the 1970s and since about 2000, but not for the period in between.
For k = 20, all multipliers show the same u-shaped pattern as for k = 0. Not surprisingly,
impact multipliers are never significantly positive, meaning that an initial 1 euro increase in
spending does not lead to a permanent rise in output. The maximum multipliers look similar
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to the multipliers at k = 0, but are smaller, which is the result of the fact that the maximum
response for output is always obtained in the initial period, while that of spending is delayed.
Finally, I find that present value and cumulativemultipliers are negativemost of the time, except
for the early 1970s and since 2000. Both are, however, never significantly different from zero.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that (a) spending shocks have a short-lived and lim-
ited impact on German output; and (b) that impact is not stable over time, but might be state
dependent.
4 Robustness and Extensions
Before I turn to a detailed analysis on which factors determine the size of fiscal multipliers and
hence the effectivity of fiscal policy in Germany, I discuss a few extensions to the baselinemodel,
which allow me to explore the robustness of the previous findings. Furthermore, extending the
model to variables other than spending and output may provide some valuable insights about
the transmission mechanism. To fix ideas, let Yt =
[
∆gf
t|t−1 ∆y
f
t|t−1 ∆gt ∆yt xt
]′
be the base-
line TVP-VAR model augmented by a scalar xt, which contains an additional variable beyond
spending and output. In order to keep the estimation procedure tractable, I add only one series
at a time and repeat the exercise for each additional variable separately. In particular, I consider
net exports, a real exchange rate, and a real interest rate.12 The latter is included to account
for possible crowding-out effects, while the former two variables are regarded as important in
an open economy context (see, e.g., Enders, Müller, and Scholl, 2011; Born et al., 2013, among
others). Estimation and identification are as before. Since xt is ordered last in Yt, the additional
variables are allowed to respond contemporaneously to a spending shock.
In Figure 11 I show the impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in spending for net exports,
the real exchange rate, and the real interest rate (left column) together with the corresponding
output responses (right column).13 The following findings are worth mentioning. First, the out-
put responses appear to be robust across specifications. Adding net exports, the real exchange
rate, or the real interest rate to the baseline TVP-VAR has little to no impact on their magnitude
and shape. Second, I obtain a decline in net exports around 1990, which is consistent with the
previous finding that fiscal multipliers were low at that time. The additional income generated
12The variables are constructed as follows. Net exports is nominal exports of goods and services minus
nominal imports of goods and services divided by nominal GDP. The real exchange rate is the real effec-
tive exchange rate based on the consumer price index (CPI). The real interest rate is the nominal interest
rate less actual CPI inflation. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the series used.
13The full set of results for the extended models is available on request from the author.
10
by fiscal policy has presumably been used to buy foreign rather than domestic goods, thereby
limiting the stimulating impact on German output. Moreover, I find that the real exchange rate
shows a stronger increase, i.e. appreciation, around the same time, which might have damp-
ened net exports as well. And finally, I obtain a larger positive response for the real interest rate
in the second part of the sample than in the first one, which is consistent with the general ten-
dency of central banks to react stronger to inflationary pressures since the mid 1980s compared
to the 1970s. There is, however, no evidence that this increased monetary policy activism has
significantly limited the effectivity of fiscal policy.
To sum up, I find that the results of the previous sections still hold when the baseline TVP-
VAR model is extended to control for relevant transmission channels.
5 Determinants of the Multipliers
In the previous sections I have shown that German fiscal multipliers vary across periods. Yet, it
is unclear what lies behind that variation. In this section I discuss which factors determine the
effectivity of fiscal policy in Germany. To that end I regress the series of multipliers on a set of
possible determinants that can be broadly grouped into three categories:
Cyclical Factors First, I include the following cyclical factors: recession dates, a measure of busi-
ness uncertainty, and a financial market stress index. While there is evidence for both the United
States (see, e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012a,b; Bachmann and Sims, 2012, among oth-
ers) and Germany (see, e.g., Baum and Koester, 2011; Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber,
2012, among others) that fiscal policy is more effective during recessions than expansions, the
literature has neglected so far a role for business uncertainty. UsingU.S. micro data, Vavra (2013)
advocates that monetary policy is less effective when business uncertainty is high since it leads
to an increase in aggregate price flexibility. In contrast, Bachmann, Born, Elstner, and Grimme
(2013) find this effect to be negligible when using German micro data. For fiscal policy, no evi-
dence has been documented yet. It could well be, however, that an increase in spending lowers
uncertainty among entrepreneurs about future orders and revenues, which in turn stabilizes the
economy by stimulating private investment.
For periods of financial market stress, it is often argued that fiscal policy could help lessen
financial market frictions, thereby lifting fiscal multipliers (see, e.g. Corsetti et al., 2012; Rafiq,
2014, among others). However, if financial market stress coincides with fiscal stress, i.e. situa-
tions in which investors are concerned about the sustainability of public debt, increased spend-
ing may well be less effective since risk premia are likely to rise.
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The recession dates are from the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat)
and include five periods of severe underutilization of production capacities.14 To obtain a mea-
sure for business uncertainty, I rely on the foreward-looking question of the Ifo Business Climate
Survey. Each month, the survey polls a representative sample of about 5,000 firms in the manu-
facturing sector on their expected production activities for the next three months.15 The answer
to this question falls into one of three qualitative categories: increase, decrease, and stay the
same. Following Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013), I proxy for uncertainty with forecast dis-
agreement and construct the business uncertainty index as
√
QE+t +QE
−
t −
(
QE+t −QE
−
t
)2
,
whereQE+t (QE
−
t ) is the fraction of firms expecting an increase (decrease) in production. While
this index is a reasonable measure for uncertainty among entrepreneurs, I also consider a finan-
cial market stress index that measures the uncertainty among investors. The composite index is
provided by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) and comprises, among others,
bank lending conditions, coporate bond and credit spreads, or stock market volatility.16
Figure 12 depicts the business uncertainty and financial market stress index together with
the recession dates. For better comparability, both indices are rescaled to have zero mean and
unit variance. The uncertainty measures undergo large swings during the sample period and
are countercyclical. The correlation between them is 0.43. While positively correlated, the figure
also reveals that business uncertainty and financial market stress move in opposite directions
during several periods, hence justifying the usage of both concepts.
Structural Factors Second, I consider several structural factors: a measure of exchange rate flex-
ibility, the degree of import penetration, a measure of fiscal sustainability, and private house-
holds’ access to credit. In contrast to the cyclical factors, these determinants change smoothly
over time and their choice can be motivated by standard models.
Exchange rate flexibility is measured by the absolute change in the CPI-based real effec-
tive exchange rate and allows me to test the prediction of standard models that multipliers are
larger when the exchange rate cannot adjust quickly to a spending shock (see, e.g., Corsetti et al.,
2012; Born et al., 2013; Ilzetzki et al., 2013, among others). Similarly, I add the import penetra-
14See Sachverständigenrat (2009). The recession dates are: 1973:2 to 1975:2, 1979:4 to 1982:4, 1991:1 to
1993:3, 2001:1 to 2005:2, and 2008:1 to 2009:2. Whenever these quarterly periods do not fully coincide with
a half year, I assume that the German economy was in recession for the entire half year that the respective
quarter corresponds to.
15The survey question reads as: “Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic production activ-
ities with respect to product X will (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
16See van Roye (2014) for a detailed description of the index methodology.
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tion rate since these models also suggest that fiscal policy is more effective when only a small
share of domestic absorption falls on imports.17 To measure fiscal sustainability, I include the
government interest payment to GDP ratio, which is a summary statistics of all factors that
are relevant when assessing the sustainability of public debt, i.e. gross debt, the interest rate,
and nominal GDP. If public finances are weak, concerns about future tax rises or even gov-
ernment solvency are likely to dampen the impact of spending shocks on output (see, e.g.,
Corsetti et al., 2012; Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller, 2013; Müller, 2014, among others). Fi-
nally, I use the ratio of household credit and disposable income to proxy for access to credit.
Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) show in a standard model that multipliers depend posi-
tively on the share of credit constraint households that are not able to insure against future tax
rises to smooth their consumption.
Institutional Factors Finally, I take two institutional factors into account. First, I add a dummy
that takes on unity from 1970:1 to 1991:2 and zero otherwise, hence controlling for the fact that
the data for the first part of the sample are for West Germany only. While it is unclear though
if, and in what direction, the inclusion of the former communist part of Germany has affected
fiscal policy effectivity, it may nevertheless be useful to account for this institutional change.
Second, I control for the adoption of the euro and include a dummy that takes on unity from
1999:1 to 2013:1 and zero otherwise. In a currency union, monetary policy is restricted since it
cannot fully counteract country-specific shocks and fiscal multipliers are hence expected to be
larger (see, e.g., Galí and Monacelli, 2008; Illing and Watzka, 2014, among others).18
Table 1 shows the results from the regression analysis. The coefficient estimates are obtained
by regressing the series of multipliers from the TVP-VAR on the set of possible determinants
and a constant using OLS. The impact multipliers are measured at k = 0, while the remaining
multipliers are evaluated at k = 20. To avoid reversed causality, I include all variables, except for
the recession dates and the institutional dummies, one period lagged. The respective standard
errors are given in parantheses below coefficient estimates. I denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. While I am aware about the limitations of such
reduced-form regressions, I nevertheless think that they may reveal some interesting insights
about the determinants of fiscal policy effectivity in Germany.
17The import penetration rate is calculated as the ratio of nominal imports of goods and services and
nominal GDP less net exports.
18See for example Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011), or
Wieland (2012) for a similar argument when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates.
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The table reveals that the results are similar across multipliers. While the signs of the coef-
ficients and significance levels are identical, I also obtain small differences in the absolute size
of the estimates. It appears that the differences between the multipliers are largely absorbed by
the constant terms. Thus I concentrate on the impact multipliers in the following.
With respect to the cyclical factors, the following results emerge from the regression analysis.
First, I obtain a small coefficient estimate for the recession dates. During recessions the multi-
plier is 0.085 euro larger than in expansions. This number is smaller than those reported in the
related literature and not significantly different from zero. In contrast, I find that business un-
certainty is strongly and significantly correlated with the size of the multipliers. If uncertainty
rises by one standard deviation, the multipliers increase by 0.227 euro. This finding suggests a
stimulating role for fiscal policy via a reduction in business uncertainty, which in fact is inde-
pendent of the state of the business cycle. Second, I find that the coefficient estimate for financial
market stress significantly points into the opposite direction. In periods of stress, fiscal policy is
less effective than in normal times (−0.168 euro), which is consistent with the idea that financial
market and fiscal stress often coincide.
Furthermore, I do not obtain support for the hypotheses that exchange rate flexibility, im-
port penetration, or households’ access to credit are connected to the size of the multipliers. For
all three variables, coefficient estimates are small in absolute value and insignificant. However, I
find a strong and significantly negative correlation between fiscal sustainability andmultipliers.
A 1 percent increase in the government interest to GDP ratio lowers the impact multipliers by
0.850 euro. Given a time series standard deviation for that ratio of 0.73, an increase of one stan-
dard deviation hence reduces the multipliers by about 0.62 euro, suggesting that the estimated
effect is of economic significance and larger than that for business uncertainty. Taken together
with the negative impact of financial market stress, I conclude that sound public finances are an
important prerequisite for fiscal policy to be effective.19
The dummy for West Germany is positive but small and insignificant, suggesting that, af-
ter controlling for other channels, the transmission of spending shocks to output has not been
different before reunification than after. Finally, I obtain a positive coefficient estimate for the
currency union dummy that is highly significant. The introduction of the euro and hence the
loss of monetary policy autonomy has lifted the impact multiplier by 0.944 euro, which un-
derlines the prominent role monetary policy has in the transmission of government spending
19When I drop the financial market stress index from the baseline regression, the coefficient estimate
for the government interest payment to GDP ratio declines from 0.850 to 0.904, supporting the notion
that both variables relate to fiscal stress.
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shocks to output. Multipliers may be large if monetary policy can only partially accommodate
a discretionary increase in spending.20
In order to check the robustness of these findings, I report the outcome of alternative regres-
sions in Table 2. First and foremost I explore whether the insignificant coefficient estimate for
the recession dates is due to the fact that other variables are also correlated to the business cycle,
thereby lowering the impact of the dates. To that end I consecutively drop business uncertainty,
financial market stress, and finally all structural factors from the regression. While both uncer-
tainty measures are strongly correlated with the business cycle, the latter are to a lesser extent.
It turns out that the coefficient estimates for the recession dates are hardly affected by remov-
ing these variables. Across all three alternative regressions, the estimated coefficients are again
small in absolute value and insignificant, hence providing no support for the hypothesis that
fiscal multipliers in Germany depend on the state of the business cycle. However, I find that the
coefficient estimates for the government interest payment to GDP ratio and the currency union
dummy are robust over all regressions. For the latter I obtain estimates that are even larger than
in the baseline regression (up to 1.493 compared to 0.944).
In addition, I run a regression on only those factors that seem to be relevant in determining
the effectivity of fiscal policy in Germany. It turns out that these factors show again plausible
and significant coefficient estimates that are also of economic relevance. Moreover, I obtain an
adjusted R2 that is marginally lower than that in the baseline regression (respectively, 0.84 and
0.85), suggesting that the removed variables explain little of the variation in multipliers.
Finally, I provide a decomposition of the fitted values from the baseline regression into the
contribution of, respectively, business uncertainty, financial market stress, government interest
payment, and the currency union dummy in Figure 13. In each plot the impact multipliers are
included in deviation from their estimated constant. Since the series are correlated, the plots
should not be interpreted as a counterfactual simulation, but to provide some intuition about
the contribution of a variable in a particular period. The figure reveals that the decrease in fiscal
policy effectivity during the 1970s and 80s can be largely attributed to a deterioration in public
finances, while the decline in business uncertainty is also relevant in the second half of the 80s.
The contribution of financial market stress is modest across all periods, except for the years after
20It should be stressed that the currency union also brought along a decrease in exchange rate flexibility
by about one third compared to the period before. And when dropping the currency union dummy from
the baseline regression, I indeed observe that the coefficient estimate for exchange rate flexibility declines
from −0.013 to −0.018 and is now signifcantly different from zero at a 10 percent level. Despite a time
series standard deviation of about 3.33, this estimated effect is, however, still small, suggesting that the
loss of monetary policy autonomy is more important in the context of a currency union than the decreased
exchange rate flexibility.
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the outburst of the global crisis in 2008 in which it contributes strongly negatively. In contrast,
business uncertainty shows a positive impact during that period. And as already discussed, the
introduction of the euro shifts the multipliers by nearly 1 euro in 1999.
To sum up, I obtain evidence that German fiscal policy is more effective when business
uncertainty is high but less in periods of financial market stress, while the state of the business
cycle is minor important. Furthermore, I find that fiscal sustainability is a crucial determinant of
the multipliers and that these are on average higher since the loss of monetay policy autonomy
due to the adoption of the euro. Other factors, such as exchange rate flexibility, the degree of
import penetration, private households’ access to credit, or German reunification appear to be
less relevant. Taken together, these results provide an explanation for the observed time profile
of fiscal multipliers.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the time varying impact of government spending shocks on output in
Germany during the period 1970:1 to 2013:1 in two steps. In a first step, I use an expectations-
augmented TVP-VAR model to establish that fiscal multipliers are not stable across periods but
exhibit a u-shaped pattern. While multipliers fluctuate around 2 at the beginning and end of the
sample, they are much smaller in between. I demonstrate that this pattern is obtained regardless
of the definition of the multipliers and robust to alternative model specifications. In addition, I
document that the size of spending shocks has declined over time and that the observed profile
squares well with important fiscal episodes.
In a second step, I discuss which factors determine the size of Germanmultipliers and hence
explain the time variation. It turns out that fiscal policy is more effective when business uncer-
tainty is high but less in periods of financial market stress, while the state of the business cycle
is minor important. Furthermore, I find that fiscal sustainability is an important determinant of
the multipliers and that these are much higher since the loss of monetary policy autonomy due
to the adoption of the euro.
Given the evidence of this paper, I conclude that policy recommendations based on average
fiscal multipliers may be misleading. Considering cyclical, structural, and institutional factors
appears to be important to predict the impact of a surprise increase in government spending on
output. Moreover, I find that independent of the state of the economy, the impact of spending
shocks is limited and short-lived, suggesting that fiscal stimuli tend to increase the government
spending share of output over longer horizons. In sum, these findings tell a cautionary tale for
fiscal policy to stimulate output in Germany.
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Figure 1: Government Spendingwith Fiscal Episodes. Notes: Shows the government spending
to GDP ratio (solid line) together with important fiscal episodes (shaded area). Government spending is
measured by government consumption. x-axis: year; y-axis: percent.
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Figure 2: Government Spending Growth and Forecast - Time Series. Notes: Shows actual
government spending growth (thin line) together with forecasted government spending growth (thick
line). x-axis: year; y-axis: percent.
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Figure 3: Government Spending Growth and Forecast - Scatterplot. Notes: Plots actual
government spending growth against forecasted government spending growth together with a regression
line obtained by regressing the former on the latter and a constant. x and y-axis: percent.
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Figure 4: Output Growth and Forecast - Time Series. Notes: Shows actual output growth (thin
line) together with forecasted output growth (thick line). x-axis: year; y-axis: percent.
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Figure 5: Output Growth and Forecast - Scatterplot. Notes: Plots actual output growth against
forecasted output growth together with a regression line obtained by regressing the former on the latter
and a constant. x and y-axis: percent.
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Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Government Spending Shocks. Notes: Shows the posterior
median (solid line) together with a 68 percent error band (dashed line). x-axis: year; y-axis: percent.
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses to Government Spending Shocks - Baseline. Notes: Shows
the posterior median. The size of the shocks is 1 percent. x-axis: horizon; y-axis: year; z-axis: percent.
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Figure 8: Fiscal Policy Multipliers. Notes: Shows the posterior median. x-axis: horizon; y-axis:
year; z-axis: euro.
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Figure 9: Fiscal Policy Multipliers after 6 Months. Notes: Shows the posterior median (solid
line) together with a 68 percent error band (dashed line). x-axis: year; y-axis: euro.
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Figure 10: Fiscal Policy Multipliers after 10 Years. Notes: Shows the posterior median (solid
line) together with a 68 percent error band (dashed line). x-axis: year; y-axis: euro.
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses to Government Spending Shocks - Extensions. Notes:
Shows the posterior median. The size of the shocks is 1 percent. x-axis: horizon; y-axis: year; z-axis:
percent/percentage points.
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Figure 12: Uncertainty Measures with Recession Dates. Notes: Shows the Ifo Business Uncer-
tainty (thin line) and the IfW Financial Market Stress Index (thick line) together with recession dates from
the German Council of Economic Experts (shaded area). Both uncertainty measures are rescaled to have
zero mean and unit variance. x-axis: year; y-axis: standard deviation.
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Figure 13: Decomposition of Fitted Values. Notes: Shows a decomposition of the fitted values
from the baseline regression (bars) together with the impact multipliers in devation from their estimated
constant (solid line). x-axis: year; y-axis: euro.
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Table 1: Determinants of the Multipliers - Baseline
Method: OLS with White Standard Errors
Sample: 1971:1 to 2013:1
Dependent Variable: Fiscal Multipliers
Independent Variables Impact Maximum Present Value Cumulative
Recession Dates 0.085 0.046 0.117 0.091
(0.082) (0.056) (0.100) (0.100)
Business Uncertainty 0.227∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.030) (0.050) (0.050)
Financial Market Stress −0.168∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.022) (0.035) (0.035)
Exchange Rate Flexibility −0.013 −0.009 −0.007 −0.009
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Import Penetration Rate 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Gov. Interest Payment to GDP −0.850∗∗∗ −0.566∗∗∗ −0.741∗∗∗ −0.724∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.123) (0.221) (0.221)
Household Credit Ratio 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
West Germany 0.121 0.080 0.261 0.262
(0.182) (0.126) (0.221) (0.219)
Currency Union 0.944∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.203) (0.373) (0.376)
Constant 0.953∗ 0.735∗ −0.397 −0.473
(0.552) (0.379) (0.689) (0.694)
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.82
Observations 85 85 85 85
Notes: Shows the estimated coefficients obtained by regressing the median multipliers from the TVP-
VAR model on a set of explanatory variables and a constant. The respective White standard errors are
given in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 2: Determinants of the Multipliers - Robustness
Method: OLS with White Standard Errors
Sample: 1971:1 to 2013:1
Dependent Variable: Impact Multipliers
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4
Recession Dates 0.075 −0.013 0.132
(0.090) (0.086) (0.108)
Business Uncertainty 0.140∗∗∗
(0.036)
Financial Market Stress −0.134∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.032)
Exchange Rate Flexibility −0.002 −0.007
(0.010) (0.010)
Import Penetration Rate 0.005 −0.000
(0.010) (0.010)
Gov. Interest Payment to GDP −0.804∗∗∗ −0.855∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.231) (0.048)
Household Credit Ratio 0.003 0.009
(0.011) (0.012)
West Germany −0.106 −0.114 0.702∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.126) (0.129)
Currency Union 1.259∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 1.493∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.376) (0.101) (0.091)
Constant 2.060∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.598) (0.081) (0.090)
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.79 0.51 0.84
Observations 85 85 85 85
Notes: Shows the estimated coefficients for some robustness checks. See also notes to Table 1.
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A Data
The table below provides a description of the series used. The format is as follows: series la-
bel, series mnemonic in Datastream (if available), series market, the original data source (OECD
Economic Outlook = EO; OECD Main Economic Indicators = MEI; Bank for International Set-
tlements = BIS), and the frequency of the series (Monthly = M; Quarterly = Q; Semi-Annual = S;
Annual = A). The last column indicates if a series is seasonally adjusted (sa). I consider all series
at semi-annual frequency for the period 1970:1 to 2013:1. Series that are available at monthly or
quarterly frequency are converted by taking averages across periods. Series that are available
at annual frequency only are interpolated, assuming no change within the year. Series for West
and reunified Germany are linked in 1991:2. Forecasts for real government consumption growth
and real GDP growth are collected from the respective vintage of the OECD Economic Outlook.
Business expectations for the manufacturing sector are provided by Sigrid Stallhofer (Ifo Insti-
tute), while the financial market stress index comes from Björn van Roye (IfW Kiel). Moreover,
I use recession dates from the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) that
are available in: “Die Zukunft nicht aufs Spiel setzen - Jahresgutachten 2009/10”, Ch. 7, p. 260.
Label Mnemonic Market Source Freq. sa
Nominal Government Final Consumption Expenditure WGOCFCGGB West EO Q x
Nominal Government Final Consumption Expenditure BDOCFCGGB Germany EO Q x
Nominal Gross Domestic Product WGOCFGPNB West EO Q x
Nominal Gross Domestic Product BDOCFGPNB Germany EO Q x
Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure WGOCFGCND West EO Q x
Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure BDOCFGCND Germany EO Q x
Real Government Consumption Growth Forecast West/Germany EO S x
Real Gross Domestic Product WGOOFGDPD West EO Q x
Real Gross Domestic Product BDOCFGDPD Germany EO Q x
Real GDP Growth Forecast West/Germany EO S x
3-Month FIBOR BDQIR076R West/Germany MEI Q
Nominal Exports of Goods and Services WGOCFXGSB West EO Q x
Nominal Exports of Goods and Services BDOCFXGSB Germany EO Q x
Nominal Imports of Goods and Services WGOCFMGSB West EO Q x
Nominal Imports of Goods and Services BDOCFMGSB Germany EO Q x
Real Effective Exchange Rates - CPI based BDQCC011H West/Germany MEI Q x
CPI All Items BDQCP009F West/Germany MEI Q x
Business Expectations: Manufacturing Sector West/Germany Ifo M x
Financial Market Stress Index West/Germany IfW M
Net Government Interest Payments as % of GDP WGOCFDB% West EO A x
Net Government Interest Payments as % of GDP BDOCFDB% Germany EO A x
Nominal Credit to Households BDBLCAHAA West/Germany BIS Q x
Nominal Disposable Income BDPERDISB West/Germany Bundesbank Q x
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B Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Estimation
In this appendix I explain the Bayesian estimation of the TVP-VAR model and provide diag-
nostics on the convergence of the Markov chain. For further details, I refer to Primiceri (2005).
See Baumeister, Durinck, and Peersman (2008) as well as Baumeister and Peersman (2013) for a
similar outline.
B.1 Model
Consider the TVP-VAR model in (1):
Yt = X
′
tBt + ut, Ωt = E
[
utu
′
t
]
. (B.1)
The covariance matrix Ωt can be decomposed as follows
21
Ωt = A
−1
t ΣtΣ
′
t
(
A′t
)−1
, (B.2)
where At is a lower triangular matrix which models the contemporaneous interactions among
variables and Σt is a diagonal matrix which contains the stochastic volatilities
At =


1 0 0 0
α21,t 1 0 0
α31,t α32,t 1 0
α41,t α42,t α43,t 1


, Σt =


σ1,t 0 0 0
0 σ2,t 0 0
0 0 σ3,t 0
0 0 0 σ4,t


.
Let α be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of At (stacked by rows), σt be the
vector of the diagonal elements of Σt, and Bt be the vector containing all the coefficients of the
TVP-VAR stacked. The time varying parameters are assumed to evolve as follows
Bt = Bt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N (0, Q) , (B.3)
αt = αt−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N (0, S) , (B.4)
log σt = log σt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0,W ) , (B.5)
where the innovation terms have zero mean, are normally distributed and independent of each
other. The elements ofBt andAt are thusmodelled as driftless randomwalks, while the stochas-
tic volatilities in Σt follow a geometric randomwalk. The randomwalk assumption reduces the
21This decomposition ensures that the covariance matrix is positive definite.
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number of parameters significantly and hence allows for an efficient estimation of the model. To
ensure stationarity, I follow Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005) and discard all draws for the coef-
ficient vector that lead to an explosive solution of the model. In particular, I check for each draw
whether the roots of the associated VAR polynomial are outside the unit circle and attribute zero
prior weight to it if they are not.
Finally, it is also assumed that S has a block-diagonal structure of the following form:
S = Var (ξt) =


S1 01×2 01×3
02×1 S2 02×3
03×1 03×2 S3

 ,
where S1 = Var (ξ21,t), S2 = Var
(
[ξ31,t, ξ32,t]
′), and S3 = Var ([ξ41,t, ξ42,t, ξ43,t]′) with Var (·)
denoting the variance operator, implying that the coefficients evolve independently in each
equation.
B.2 Priors
In contrast to the related literature, I do not preserve a training sample to calibrate the prior
distributions for the initial states, but run a constant parameter version of the model on the full
sample from 1970:1 to 2013:1 using OLS. In situations in which the total number of observa-
tions is relatively small (here 87 semi-annual observations), this procedure is a valid alternative
to training sample priors (see, e.g., Kirchner et al., 2010). Following Primiceri (2005), I assume
that the initial states for the coefficients (B0), the contemporaneous relations (α0), the stochas-
tic volatilities (σ0) and the hyperparamters (Q,S,W ) are independent of each other. For the
coefficients and contemporaneous relations I specify normal priors p (·) of the following form:
p (B0) = N
(
Bˆ, Vˆ
Bˆ
)
and p (α0) = N
(
αˆ, Vˆαˆ
)
, where the mean values ofB0 and α0 are set to their
corresponding OLS point estimates. The variance for B0 is chosen to be four times the variance
in a constant parameter version of the model. Moreover, I follow Benati and Mumtaz (2007)
and set Vˆαˆ = 10 · diag ˆ|α|. While this choice for the variance of α0 is arbitrary, it accounts for
the different magnitude of the elements. Finally, I assume a log-normal prior for the stochastic
volatilities: p (log σ0) = N (log σˆ, 10 · I4). I set the mean value for σ0 to the corresponding OLS
point estimate and the variance to ten times the identity matrix.
Let IW (Ψ,m) denote the inverted Wishart distribution with scale matrix Ψ and m degrees
of freedom. The priors for the hyperparameters Q and W are specified as follows: p (Q) =
IW
(
0.0032 · 36 · Vˆ
Bˆ
, 36
)
and p (W ) = IW
(
0.012 · 5 · I4, 5
)
, where the scale matrices are constant
fractions of the variances from a time invariant model multiplied by the degrees of freedom,
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while the latter are set to one plus the dimension of the B0 and σ0 matrix, respectively. The
value for the scaling parameter in p (Q) is the same as in Primiceri (2005) and conservative
with respect to the prior belief about time variation in the coefficients. Finally, I consider the
following priors for the blocks of S: p (S1) = IW
(
0.12 · 2 · Vˆαˆ1 , 2
)
, p (S2) = IW
(
0.12 · 3 · Vˆαˆ2 , 3
)
and p (S3) = IW
(
0.12 · 4 · Vˆαˆ3 , 4
)
, where αˆ1, αˆ2 and αˆ3 are the corresponding blocks to S1, S2
and S3 of αˆ. The degrees of freedom are again set to one plus the number of corresponding
entries in α0, the minimum number for the invertedWishart distribution to be proper. Specified
in this way, the prior is diffuse and at best weakly informative, and hence soon dominated by
the information in the data.
B.3 Gibbs Sampling
To simulate the joint posterior distribution of (BT , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W ), I use a Gibbs sampling
algorithm. The Gibbs sampler is a MCMC method and is carried out by sequentially drawing
time varying coefficients (BT ), contemporaneous relations (AT ), stochastic volatilities (ΣT ) and
hyperparamters (Q,S,W ), given the data and the rest of the parameters. The approach allows
for an efficient estimation of the model since it treats all parameters as separate blocks and does
not require to write down a complicated likelihood for the model. The superscript (·)T indicates
that the complete data is used in estimation. The Gibbs sampler thus produces smoothed
estimates of the parameters using all the information available in the data, as opposed to
filtered estimates that exhaust only the information contained in a particular subsample.
The steps are:
Step 1: Initialize AT , ΣT , sT , Q, S, andW .
Step 2: Sample BT from p
(
BT |Y T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
Conditional on all other parameters and the data, the observation equation
yt = X
′
tBt + ut = X
′
tBt + A
−1
t Σtet, with et ∼ N (0, I), is linear and has Gaussian
innovations. Draws for Bt = Bt−1 + νt are obtained from N
(
Bt|t+1, Pt|t+1
)
, where
Bt|t+1 = E
(
Bt|Bt+1, Y
T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
and Pt|t+1 = Var
(
Bt|Bt+1, Y
T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
,
using the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994).
Step 3: Sample AT from p
(
AT |Y T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
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The system of equations yt = X
′
tBt+A
−1
t Σtet can be written asAt (yt −X
′
tBt) = Atyˆt = Σtet,
where, conditional on BT , yˆt is observable. Since At is lower triangular with ones on the main
diagonal, the system of equations is given by
yˆ1,t = σ1,te1,t, (B.6)
yˆi,t = −yˆ[1,i−1],tαi,t + σi,tei,t, i = 2, ..., 5 , (B.7)
where ei,t is the i-th element of et and yˆ[1,i−1],t denotes the row vector [yˆ1,t, yˆ2,t, ..., yˆi,t].
Given that S is block-diagonal, the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be applied
equation by equation to obtain draws for αi,t from N
(
αi,t|t+1,Λi,t|t+1
)
, where αi,t|t+1 =
E
(
αi,t|αi,t+1, Y
T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
and Λi,t|t+1 = Var
(
αi,t|αi,t+1, Y
T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
Step 4: Sample ΣT from p
(
ΣT |Y T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
.
Consider the system of non-linear measurement equations At (yt −X
′
tBt) = y
∗
t = Σtet,
where, conditional on BT and AT , y∗t is observable. Squaring and taking logarithms of each
element converts the system into a linear one:
y∗∗t = 2 ht + gt, (B.8)
ht = ht−1 + ηt, (B.9)
where y∗∗i,t = log
[(
y∗i,t
)2
+ 0.001
]
; the constant (0.001) makes the estimation procedure more
robust; hi,t = log σi,t; and gi,t = log
(
e2i,t
)
. Though linear, the system is non-Gaussian
since the innovations in the measurement equations are distributed as log χ2 (1). I follow
Kim, Shepard, and Chib (1998) and use a mixture of seven normal densities with component
probabilities qj , means mj − 1.2704, and variances v
2
j to transform the system into a Gaussian
one. The parameters
(
qj ,mj , v
2
j
)
are chosen to match the moments of the log χ2 (1) distribution:
Let sT = [s1, ..., sT ]
′ be the matrix of indicator variables selecting the member of the
mixture, j = 1, ..., 7, used for each element of e. Conditional on BT , AT , Q, S, W , and sT , the
system is approximately Gaussian and the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be used
to draw ht from N
(
ht|t+1, Ht|t+1
)
, where ht|t+1 = E
(
ht|ht+1, Y
T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
and Ht|t+1 = Var
(
ht|ht+1, Y
T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
. As has been pointed out by
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Table B.1: Mixing distributions as in Kim et al. (1998)
j qj mj v
2
j
1 0.00730 -10.12999 5.79596
2 0.10556 -3.97281 2.61369
3 0.00002 -8.56686 5.17950
4 0.04395 2.77786 0.16735
5 0.34001 0.61942 0.64009
6 0.24566 1.79518 0.34023
7 0.25750 -1.08819 1.26261
Del Negro and Primiceri (2013) it is important that the indicator variables sT are sample
before the stochastic volatilities.
Step 5: Sample Q,S,W from p
(
Q|Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, p
(
S|Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, and
p
(
W |Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, respectively.
Conditional on Y T , AT , BT , and ΣT , the hyperparameters Q,S,W have in-
verted Wishard posterior distributions from which draws can be directly obtained, see
Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995).
Step 6: Go to step 2.
In total, I perform 100,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, discarding the first 50,000 for con-
vergence and keep one for every 50 of the remaining 50,000 draws to economize storage space
and to further reduce autocorrelation among them. Since the Gibbs sampler is a dependence
chain algorithm, posterior draws are correlated. The remaining 1,000 draws are used for infer-
ence. Below I present inefficiency factors, showing that the Markov chain has indeed converged
to its ergodic distribution. Moreover, I have inspected recursive means for some parameters,
started the Gibbs sampler at distinct initial conditions, and considered chains of different length.
All these experiments indicate that posterior draws come from the same distribution.
B.4 Convergence
In order to check for the convergence of theMarkov chain, I follow Primiceri (2005) and calculate
inefficiency factors (IFs) for the time varying coefficients BT (3,060 in total), the free elements
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Table B.2: Distribution of Inefficiency Factors
Parameter/ Statistic Mean Median Min. 16th Prct. 84th Prct. Max.
Coefficients 10.76 9.37 4.22 5.34 15.53 33.96
Contemporaneous Relations 7.36 7.06 3.55 5.48 8.76 19.75
Stochastic Volatilities 47.16 38.70 5.61 14.93 81.26 129.66
Hyperparameter Q 11.98 11.91 4.09 8.93 15.16 21.33
Hyperparameter S 9.66 9.90 5.48 6.10 11.84 15.57
Hyperparameter W 80.50 79.65 54.41 60.34 100.84 116.19
of the contemporaneous relations AT (510 in total), the stochastic volatilities ΣT (340 in total),
the distinct elements of the hyperparameters Q and W (666 and 10 in total, respectively), as
well as the free and distinct elements of the hyperparameter S (10 in total). The IF is defined
as 1 + 2
∑∞
s=1 ρs, where ρs is the estimated autocorrelation of the chain at lag s. Since indepen-
dence sampling produces an IF that is equal to one and Gibbs sampling typically produces an
IF greater than one, the IF quantifies the relative efficiency loss in the computation of posterior
draws from dependent versus independent samples. In practice, values around 20 are regarded
as efficient (see, e.g., Primiceri, 2005, among others), meaning that the econometrician needs to
draw 20 times as many MCMC draws as from uncorrelated samples.
Following Benati and Mumtaz (2007) as well as Baumeister and Benati (2013), I calculate the
IFs as the inverse of the relative numerical efficiency measure (RNE) of Geweke (1992):
RNE = (2pi)−1
1
S (0)
∫ pi
−pi
S (ω) dω, (B.10)
where S (ω) denotes the spectral density of the sequence of draws at frequency ω. I estimate the
spectral densities by smoothing the periodograms in the frequency domain using a 4 percent
tapered window as in Primiceri (2005).
Figure B.1 plots the IFs for all 4,596 parameters, while Table B.2 provides some summary
statistics for the distribution of the IFs. Except for the stochastic volatilities and their hyperpa-
rameters W, the 84th percentile is below or even well below 20 for all sets of parameters. The
IFs are exceptionally low for the contemporaneous relations and their covariance matrix S for
which all of the IFs are below 20. The distribution of the stochastic volatilities and their co-
variance matrix W is centered around, respectively, 39 and 80, meaning that drawing from the
posterior distribution is less efficient for these parameters. Overall, the IFs are comparable to
those in Primiceri (2005), suggesting that posterior draws come from the ergodic distribution.
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Figure B.1: Inefficiency Factors. Notes: Shows the inefficiency factors for all states (left column)
and hyperparameters (right column) of the TVP-VAR model to check for the convergence of the Markov
chain. x-axis: parameter; y-axis: inefficiency factor.
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